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What is democracy promotion? 
today, we are witnessing a new wave of interest in democracy. in his 2009 
Guidance note on Democracy, the Un secretary General brought it to the 
point: ‘Democracy, based on the rule of law, is ultimately a means to achieve 
international peace and security, economic and social progress and devel-
opment, and respect for human rights’ (Un secretary General, 2009). the 
secretary General’s statement also effectively summarizes the main reasons 
and motivations behind switzerland’s engagement in the field of democracy 
assistance. as a small european state, we have an overwhelming interest in 
a peaceful world governed by law; as an export-oriented economy we benefit 
from stability and respect for human rights abroad. switzerland’s humanitar-
ian tradition, finally, similarly supports the promotion of democracy.
but what is democracy? even though the concept is still not unanimously 
shared, over the last several years, a broad international consensus has 
emerged. most of definitions are based on two basic concepts derived from 
the seminal work of the political scientist robert Dahl – political equality and 
popular participation in decision-making. in order to achieve this, certain 
‘essential elements’ are required: vertical accountability mechanisms, such as 
elections, and horizontal accountability mechanisms, such as the separation 
and balance of powers. but how do countries acquire these mechanisms, and 
how do we translate this conceptual definition into democracy promotion? 
as illustrated by the recent events in north africa, we have long under-
stood that democracy requires more than just formal institutions and proce-
dures, such as elections. rather, there needs to be what the eU has termed 
‘deep democracy’:1 an understanding that democracy is not merely a matter 
of changing governments, but about building the right institutions and the 
right attitudes for a given societal context. Democracy promotion thus includes 
respect for the rule of law, freedom of speech, respect for human rights, an 
independent judiciary and impartial administration. this new wave of democ-
racy promotion is also informed by several critiques developed over the past 
two decades, based on the transitional experiences of eastern europe and 
the arab spring.
as will be developed throughout this article, switzerland shares this com-
mitment to deeper democracy – not just as a result of its democracy assistance 
efforts but also through its own experience at home. the swiss governance 
system, which is very much influenced by the practice of direct democracy, 
offers all citizen an opportunity for active participation in decision-making. 
its stability is derives from the deeply-ingrained belief of swiss citizens in 
the value of democracy and the creation of institutional incentives to seek 
consensus and consider the needs of minorities in decision-making.
Discussions on democracy promotion have kept the swiss Development 
cooperation (sDc) busy for many years. an initial milestone was the fall of 
1 Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Euro-
pean Commission, Speech on the main aspects and basic choices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
Common Security and Defence policy, European Parliament Strasbourg, 11 May 2011, SPEECH/11/236, Event Date: 
11/05/2011
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the iron curtain, which opened the way for democratisation in former com-
munist countries. concerns regarding development effectiveness in relation 
to the millennium Development Goals (mDGs) and state fragility and conflict 
have kept the debate on the importance of better governance and effective 
states to development cooperation success alive. most recently, the democratic 
uprisings in the middle east have raised new questions among scholars as 
well as policy makers and practitioners: How can we support civil society 
actors to become true agents of democracy? How do we include the military 
in democratisation processes? How can we support parties and parliamen-
tary structures? How can we impartially support both the opposition and 
the government? in the following article, i tackle four recurrent issues in the 
democracy promotion debate, informed by the experiences of switzerland 
and the sDc, that are central to this new understanding of ‘deep democracy’.
A New Way of Democracy Promotion?
Developed Democracy – Democratic Development
Having elaborated our understanding of democracy promotion – namely the 
support of actors in achieving respect for the rule of law, freedom of speech, 
respect for human rights, an independent judiciary and impartial administra-
tion – we will now establish the link between democracy and development. 
Why are we, as a development organization, particularly suited to promoting 
democracy? the discussion is an old one. since the 1960s, we have known that 
‘democracy promoters’ and ‘development actors’ should join forces. the sDc 
is convinced, moreover, that democracy and development are complementary; 
they reinforce each other. We are convinced that democratic advances are 
unlikely to be sustainable if they are not matched by wealth and job crea-
tion, as well as a corresponding reduction in inequality. the link between 
democracy and development originates from both the rights and obligations 
borne by peoples and individuals. We also know, however, that the depth and 
breadth of these noble sentiments is not enough. the Washington consensus, 
to name the most significant example, incorporated a recognition of these 
simple links, and yet we have seen that in several contexts, the consensus did 
more harm than good. as such, the sDc must strive to establish this link in 
its practical and daily work. the sDc’s experience in decentralisation activi-
ties provides an interesting example of this practice. on a smaller scale, they 
illustrate the strong interrelation of political and technical issues; political, 
administrative and fiscal decentralisation define the priorities for the rule 
of law, institutional democratisation, the improvement of public services, 
local control over resources and eradication of poverty. With this in mind, 
we realize that mere sequencing is not a solution. instead, we must endeavor 
to build specific democracy promotion aims into every development project.
Democracy Assistance requires National Ownership
evidence from a number of countries indicates that the efforts of interna-
tional actors to impose democracy in the absence of strong domestic support 
are unlikely to be successful in the long run. in many cases, such actions risk 
doing significant harm (Foresti and Harris, 2011, 9). to be successful, democ-
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racy assistance must be sensitive to context, such as different standards of 
living, different societal compositions and histories of conflict, or different 
economic and political institutional capacity. in other words, we need to 
understand the context-specific ‘social fabric’ to perform effective democracy 
promotion. such efforts need to be anchored in a collective vision of progress, 
reflected in home-grown and shared democratic agendas. instead of exporting 
democracy, an emphasis should be placed on processes of dialogue aimed 
at determining factors and modalities of democracy, such as inclusive and 
peaceful processes of decision-making and strong domestic accountability 
systems for effective states. this also implies a renewed interest in the ‘drivers 
of democracy’, leading to the development of programs empowering the most 
relevant (i.e. influential) actors, both positively and negatively, and increasing 
the political weight and active role of often-disempowered groups such as 
women, youth and minorities.
the sDc works with civil society organizations (csos) as key development 
actors and helps them develop democratic ownership, as they begin to partic-
ipate in the policy-making process and act as a voice of marginalized groups. 
the sDc engages with these local drivers of democracy in several ways: (a) 
financing the activities of csos (either directly or through a basket fund that 
may include earmarked contributions); (b) mandating csos directly with a 
particular activity; (c) building the capacity of the csos and associated part-
ners; or (d) incorporating a political dialogue as to the implementation of pro-
graming into each project. the aid modalities strongly depend on the specific 
contexts of a country. this discussion of national ownership is linked to recent 
international interest in supporting and promoting effective states in fragile 
contexts. in 2007, the oecD/Dac published the Principles for Good engagement 
in Fragile states and situations, based on the understanding that these contexts 
require a different approach (mcloughlin, 2012). the work of the international 
Dialogue on Peacebuilding and statebuilding (a forum for discussion between 
the oecD and the G7+, a group of self-declared fragile states) is also relevant in 
this regard. it culminated, in november 2011, in the ‘new Deal’, the outcome of 
the fourth High-level Forum on aid effectiveness, in busan. they concluded 
that the complex state-society relations typical to fragile and conflict-affected 
societies must be taken into account in policy reform, state-led service delivery 
and the support of democratic elections (UnDP, 2012, 11).
over the years, the sDc has developed different instruments to promote and 
incorporate effective local governance and social accountability in its work. 
the sDc has conducted and supported various local governance assessments,2 
developing an in-depth understanding of not only baseline and existing needs, 
but also the demands of establishing various forms of domestic accountability 
at local level. the sDc conducts its national assessments of political economy 
and democratic progress in a similar manner, sensitively assessing different 
kinds of support to actors or processes in its democracy promotion programs. 
2 Local Governance Assessments are used by the SDC’s donors and partners to evaluate the performance of local 
governance. Depending on the specific tool used for assessment, they can focus either on effectiveness and efficiency; 
transparency, participation and inclusiveness; or downward accountability. The SDC experience highlights the impor-
tance of taking a participatory approach to local governance assessment.
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local governance or democracy assessments will not necessarily diminish 
the potential for conflict inherent to possible interventions; to the contrary, 
such assessments may even inadvertently trigger further conflict, as they try 
to take horizontal inequalities truly into account. as indicated above, how-
ever, the sDc is aware of the political nature of its work and will therefore 
continue to employ a multi-stakeholder approach designed to build consensus 
among all involved groups and establish (political) space for sustainable and 
effective interventions.
Furthermore, the sDc has made the strategic decision to increase its work 
in fragile and conflict affected states by 15-20 per cent. as a result, the sDc 
recently decided to evaluate its instruments for fragile and conflict-affected 
situations. this evaluation – externally commissioned but developed for 
internal purposes – found that the sDc is well positioned to work in fragile 
states. it has the right mixture of approaches, strong operational instincts and 
the potential to play an important and valuable role in the wider international 
system. an emerging consensus exists as to the types of assistance needed 
to help fragile states and post-conflict countries get on the path to devel-
opment. Priorities include providing security, helping establish legitimate 
and transparent institutions, providing jobs and spurring economic activity. 
correspondingly, in addition to the sDc’s focus on service provision at the 
local level, an increasing emphasis will also be placed on the rule of law and 
security sector reform, building on the number of such projects currently 
underway (e.g. security sector in bolivia).
Democracy Assistance requires a Long-Term Commitment
informed by the recognition that europe itself required centuries to reach 
the level of democracy it enjoys today, it is not disputed that democratisation 
is a long-term and non-linear process. the need to pursue sustainable devel-
opment in tandem with strengthened democratic governance thus exists in 
tension with the short-term imperative for development cooperation to pro-
duce success stories. this also lines up with some recent reflections on the 
millennium Development Goals. While there is general agreement that the 
mDGs have had a tremendous influence on the international aid agenda, they 
have also triggered criticism. conversations regarding the aims and nature of 
the post-mDG development framework have been underway for some time, 
and are expected to peak in 2013. Until now, democratic governance has been 
‘overlooked’ in the mDGs. Functioning democratic institutions are a decisive 
supportive factor, however, in the achievement truly participatory, effective 
and sustainable development results.
one of the sDc’s priorities is to engage in long-term dialogue and cooper-
ation regarding democracy, on the basis of strong relationships with relevant 
local stakeholders within the political institutions and civil society. Forging 
and maintaining these relationships requires a significant amount of trust 
that can only be reached through a pattern of sustained and constructive 
engagement over several years. the sDc’s programs, split into ‘phases’, very 
often span a time period of more than a decade, thus allowing the establish-
ment of key relationships and the continuity needed to accompany long-term 
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processes. to this end, the sDc will also promote the inclusion of democracy 
as a new mDG.
Democracy Assistance is Political
Democratisation is a process that by definition changes the power dynam-
ics within a society, and democracy assistance, in supporting this process, 
is thus inherently political. nevertheless, providing support for democratic 
transitions remains a legitimate endeavor sanctioned in the swiss constitution. 
the key challenge is to design a programmatic response that is non-partisan 
and entails work with all political stakeholders, including both government 
and opposition forces.
this insight is linked again to the oecD’s initiative on aid effectiveness. 
apart from the principle of local ownership, it also resulted in an agreement 
on the principle of accountability. While developing countries stress the need 
for the international accountability of aid, oecD donor countries usually 
emphasize the need for ‘domestic accountability’ by recipients. most recently, 
this has led to discussions regarding the importance of certain elements of 
democratic governance and the development of principles related to supporting 
electoral processes, the media, as well as political parties and parliaments.
as switzerland is often seen as an impartial player, thus facilitating engage-
ment in politically difficult areas, the sDc is particularly well situated for 
deepening democracy promotion. over the years, the sDc has also accumu-
lated a tremendous amount of experience in decentralisation, particularly with 
respect to the modalities most effective in ensuring that bringing government 
closer to the people is coupled with an increase in democracy and accountabil-
ity. to ensure this, csos were strengthened such that they were able to fulfill 
their role in promoting social accountability and lobby for the appropriate 
use of public funds. Furthermore, in order to better promote democracy, the 
sDc has begun to include political economy analysis in its programming, 
moving the ‘hidden’ aspects of power to the forefront of its analysis. this 
means looking beyond the façade of formal democratic systems in order to 
understand the relevant power relations inherent to a particular setting and 
then translating this knowledge into concrete programming.
Democracy Promotion and Swiss Cooperation
Mandate to Promote Democracy
swiss foreign policy has a clear constitutional mandate to support democ-
racy and good governance.3 the swiss Federal council’s message on inter-
national cooperation 2013 to 2016 thus includes providing support to states 
undergoing transitions to democratic, market-based systems as one of five 
strategic goals, and outlines the preferred approach for their achievement 
3 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, Art. 54, Paragraph 2: ‘The Confederation shall ensure that the 
independence of Switzerland and its welfare is safeguarded; it shall in particular assist in the alleviation of need and 
poverty in the world and promote respect for human rights and democracy, the peaceful co-existence of peoples as well 
as the conservation of natural resources’. 
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(sDc, 2012b, 30). the main areas of focus that fall under the rubric of this 
goal are state reform, local governance and citizen participation.
the way in which we promote democracy in international relations is 
deeply rooted in our own democratic culture, history and practice. switzerland 
was built from bottom up, in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity 
and municipal autonomy4, thus promoting both local authority and citizen 
participation. these political features interact with more traditional forms of 
political life, such as parties, elected bodies or courts. thus, the swiss federal 
system, as well as its form of direct democracy, underscores the core ideas of 
our approach to democracy promotion: decentralisation, domestic accounta-
bility, democratic ownership, transparency and citizens’ participation. the 
local level is considered the basis for democracy, where the establishment of 
legitimate, effective and accountable governments is key.
switzerland has been involved in local democracy promotion for decades. 
to illustrate this in figures, between 2006 and 2010 cHF 338 million have 
been spent on the promotion of rule of law and democratisation. Within this, 
43 per cent was spent on the establishment of institutions and support of 
democratic processes, 11 per cent on decentralisation, 24 per cent on local 
service delivery (efficiency, quality, just access, etc.), and 21 per cent on local 
government (accountability, transparency).
in the following, i will discuss the sDc’s contribution to democracy pro-
motion, distinguishing between projects that aim to (a) render the state more 
democratic and (b) empower democratic actors of democracy. Human rights, 
as well as the empowerment of women, youth and disadvantaged groups, are 
crosscutting issues. as in any other field of development, gender-sensitivity 
is mainstreamed. For each of these issues, i use an illustrative example to 
highlight the work of the sDc.
Rendering the State more Democratic
Democracy promotion at the local level is one of the core knowledge areas 
of the sDc. Democratic transition entails building strong institutions and a 
capable state. effective and responsive public administration, both national 
and local, is vital, not only due to its role in managing resources and steering 
economic and social development, but also as a key instrument for shaping 
democratic state-society relationships and good governance (Un secretary 
General, 2009, 8).
Supporting Decentralisation and Good Governance at the Local Level
as indicated above, the sDc has over 30 years of experience, knowledge 
and expertise in decentralisation and local governance to draw upon. We are 
aware of the advantages and disadvantages of decentralised structures and 
4 Both principles of constitutional recognition emphasize the importance of subnational governments in Switzer-
land. Under the notion of subsidiarity (art. 5a of the constitution), all activities not explicitly assigned to the higher 
political levels remain within the scope of cantonal or municipal authorities. Under the notion of autonomy, within the 
constitutional and legal framework, lower units organize themselves and decide how to accomplish their tasks. Higher 
levels should thus only take over powers of the lower levels when the lower levels are not able to assume their respon-
sibilities or when an overarching solution is absolutely needed.
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apply this knowledge to promote suitable decentralisation policies in our 
partner countries. the ideal situation includes the creation of entities with 
clear tasks, responsibilities, competencies and finances. Fiscal compensa-
tion mechanisms distribute resources between regions of differing wealth 
and regulate the financial flows between local governments and the center. 
autonomous counties with fiscal sovereignty provide the services needed by 
their citizens and enable developmental progress for all sectors of society.
among the important lessons learned by the sDc is that the various aspects 
of decentralisation (political, administrative, fiscal) must go hand in hand; 
local governments will not be able to deliver on their new responsibilities if 
they are not financially capable of doing so. in a similar vein, support also 
needs to address the generally weaker capacity of institutions at the sub-na-
tional levels, as only a viable and active local society is aware of its rights 
and duties. in order to be effective and sustainable, however, support must 
include all government levels. Further, as indicated above, decentralisation 
programs need to be based on sound political economy analyses that map 
out both influential actors that may drive the process forward and potential 
winners and losers of such processes, in order to avoid efforts by the latter 
to thwart progress.
the sDc’s cHF 13 million governance and decentralisation program in 
mongolia is a prime example of this experience in action. in mongolia, the 
sDc has earned respect as a bilateral lead donor with a ‘hands-on’ approach 
in important sectors, such as the streamlining of government services. local 
mandates and sDc self-implementation, supported by international backing, 
were consciously chosen as the preferred aid modalities. as early as the 
2007-2012 cooperation strategy, the sDc worked on governance, with a focus 
on improving access to public administrative services and increasing the 
self-governance capacity of local governments and communities. the main 
improvement derived from this period is the inclusion of governance as its 
own domain, referred to as state reform, local Governance and civic Par-
ticipation, in the new 2013-2016 strategy. in this domain, swiss support will 
foster efficient and fair local governments, satisfied citizens and genuinely 
representative and effective csos.
Promotion of Good Governance
analogous to democracy, there is no global consensus on the concept of 
good governance. Within the sDc, we assume that ‘good’ governance refers 
primarily to the output side of government legitimacy, i.e. government capabil-
ity and performance in delivering essential services to citizens. ‘Democratic’ 
governance, on the other hand, refers to the input side of government legit-
imacy, i.e. referencing how and to what extent citizens are able to influence 
decision-making. in this sense, the most important question in this domain 
is: How can governments be supported in such a way that their activities are 
in line with the principles of non-discrimination and effectiveness? 
the sDc is involved in good governance processes in a variety of ways, 
such as fostering transparent taxation and clear budgetary priorities at the 
local level. through the use of different local governance support instru-
ments, the sDc also fights against corruption. an interesting example of the 
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specific sDc approach, strongly based on dialogue and locally embedded 
processes, is a 2009-2013 project in bolivia, wherein the sDc has worked to 
build the capacity of democratic institutions and promote dialogue between 
both the various levels of government and the government(s) and the popula-
tion. through technical support to the executive, the ministry of Justice and 
the ministry of Defense, the program improves these institutions’ ability to 
implement the national plan of action for human rights. at the same time, the 
sDc assists the ministry of transparency and anti-corruption in its endeavor 
to scale-up a system allowing for the transparent and efficient administration 
of funds in various other ministries. Finally, the establishment of discussion 
forums promotes open dialogue between public sector institutions and civil 
society. contributions and reflections of universities and think tanks to these 
discussions are intended to facilitate the transparent, factual and balanced 
implementation of the new constitution.
Strengthening the Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform
according to the Un secretary General, the rule of law is a principle of 
governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, 
including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent 
with international human rights norms and standards. if political equality 
and popular control are the two main elements common to any definition of 
democracy, then the rule of law should be understood as underscoring these 
aims. it is based on the equality of citizens before the law and the popular 
control of all segments of society, including the judiciary and the armed forces.
the sDc also has ample experience in this field (schlaeppi, 2008). the most 
recent insights into these forms of assistance suggest that development actors 
ought to attempt to influence the cultural norms and expectations of public 
servants and citizens, thus encouraging bottom-up change within society 
through an emphasis on power and culture instead of laws and institutions. a 
functioning separation of powers and corresponding legal framework for the 
subordinate entities are necessary conditions for a democratic and efficient 
state based on the rule of law. the sDc also supports security sector reforms 
as part of its democratisation strategies in different countries. the access to 
Justice and Judicial reform Project (2008-2011) in tajikistan, which addressed, 
amongst other issues, the weakness of the judiciary, is an example of one such 
program. the project thus focused on building the capacity of tajik judges, 
increasing their competence and professionalism and thus their ability to 
render justice in accordance with the law.
Promote Democracy Stakeholders
a second set of sDc democracy promotion activities may be subsumed 
under the promotion of democracy stakeholders. as indicated above, the 
external imposition of democracy in the absence of strong domestic support 
is unlikely to be successful in the long run. on the contrary, such actions risk 
doing significant harm (Foresti and Harris, 2011). an explicit focus on domes-
tic democratic stakeholders – or drivers of democratic change – is therefore 
extremely important (Un secretary General, 2009, 3); without democrats there 
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can be no democracy. Democratisation is only possible if those who believe 
in democracy are prepared to commit to it. supporting processes of democ-
ratisation must therefore begin with an attempt to identify potential drivers 
of change, namely organized or individual democratic opposition forces and/
or human rights defenders.
We believe that as switzerland, we have a tradition of transparent and dem-
ocratic political discourse and provide platforms for the expression of diverse 
viewpoints and perspectives. Until now, support for democracy stakeholders 
was strongly focused on civil society and the media. recently, the sDc has 
begun to engage with stakeholders involved with formal political institutions, 
like political parties or parliaments, as well.
Support to Civil Society
From the 1990s to the present, support to civil society has been the main 
medium through which sDc channels its democracy assistance (youngs, 2005, 
42). a well-functioning, vibrant and pluralistic civil society sector can contrib-
ute to democratic governance in various ways. csos can influence the state by 
lobbying for more transparency and promoting a more informed and engaged 
citizenry that, as a result, is more likely to hold government accountable. this 
approach has been subject to criticism, increasingly so following the recent 
developments in the middle east and north africa region, as donors tend to 
assist professionalized csos rather than other types of groups that make up 
civil society (e.g. groups lacking formal education at the political periphery).
the sDc has a recognized tradition of supporting long-term citizen awareness 
and promoting plurality. our projects focus on the establishment of checks and 
balances through csos and contribute to the diversity of power through citizens 
and human rights organizations. For example, the sDc has implemented a cHF 
12 million social accountability program in tanzania (2009-2014), with the aim 
of strengthening the capacity of civil society to engage with local government 
institutions on matters of public planning, budgeting and performance moni-
toring, thus improving service delivery at the local level.
Media Development
the media’s role in a democratic system is to provide access to information 
and a platform for debate and discussion – be it on the performance of the 
government, the needs of the people, the issues affecting a particular country 
or region, the opinions of civil society leaders and the programs of political 
parties, etc. a well-developed media sector ensures transparency and pro-
vides the first element required for government accountability. With the rise 
of information and communication technology (ict), including new social 
media, this sector of democracy assistance is rapidly changing. During the 
arab spring, policy analysts acknowledged the importance of icts5 and all 
related forms of media as strong catalysts for social change.
5 ‘ICTs include ‘mobile phones and Internet-based applications such as email, blogs, forums, social networking sites 
(SNS) such as Facebook and Twitter, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) programs such as Skype in Manrique M. 
and M. Barah (2011): 1 
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the sDc promotes the media as a political actor through the provision of 
support for electoral campaigns and civic education. in post-conflict sudan, 
and now in the newly independent nation of south sudan, for instance, the 
sDc has implemented a media support program since 2005, with the aim of 
ensuring access to high-quality informational and educational news-sources 
for the sudanese population, allowing the people to remain abreast of the 
political, economic and social changes taking place in their country and play 
an active and responsible role in the reconstruction process.
Furthermore, the sDc also questions and discusses the role of new infor-
mation technologies, particularly the connection between new forms of 
democratic action undertaken via ict and that conducted through classical 
institutions like political parties.6
Support to Political Parties and Parliaments
in hybrid political systems, where democratic institutions are in place, but 
are captured by an insular elite, regular elections take place but do not result 
in significant transfers of power. citizens live in a political and institutional 
context where human rights remain subject to abuse and few, if any, alter-
native political choices are available to citizens. the executive branches of 
government remain dominant, unresponsive to the needs of the citizenry, as 
well as largely unaccountable and opaque. a common feature of such systems 
is the weakness and elite capture of political parties, which, in other circum-
stances, would be crucially important to a functioning democracy. the roles 
and work of political parties is closely interlinked with that of parliaments, 
and the effectiveness of each depends on the quality and strength of the other.
the sDc is well aware that one key challenge of support to political parties 
and parliaments is the political nature of such work. in order to circumvent 
this7, we support the capacity development of political parties in a systemic 
manner, including all major parties and addressing the rules for the function-
ing and financing of political parties. relevant issues would be the ways in 
which they relate to each other and to major political institutions. switzer-
land’s semi-professional parliament8 and political party system characterized 
by few paid human resources and financial dependence on other powerful 
stakeholders, like business associations, lobbies or trade unions, from the 
outside, might not appear to be the best partner for political party support 
and development. We are convinced, however, that we are well-suited to sup-
porting niche actions with regard to the responsiveness and accountability 
of elites to their party members: What is the best way to promote internal 
democracy within parties? What is required to organize a ‘decentralised’ 
6 Workshop with IDEA on New Media, October 2012.
7 And in line with the OECD/DAC GOVNET orientations and principles.
8 While in most countries the parliamentarians do not have another profession, in Switzerland, most parliamentari-
ans maintain a career independent of their activities as a politician. Therefore, the Federal Assembly is characterized as 
a semi-professional parliament. The members of parliament devote an average of 60 per cent of their working hours to 
their parliamentary duties (sessions, preparation, commission or parliamentary group meetings, etc.). This arrangement 
holds true for many public tasks that are taken over on a part-time basis. Due to the high workload, there are regular 
calls for a full-time organization of parliament. A semi-professional system, however, ensures that parliamentarians are 
close to the people and can incorporate their professional knowledge into their parliamentary work.
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party where support is rooted in the communities? Furthermore, due to the 
semi-professional militia system, the swiss parliamentary support system is 
highly elaborated. this provides an interesting case for consideration when 
thinking about the best support organizations for parliaments.
the sDc has already implemented a few projects strengthening parliaments 
or parties. From early 2009 to the end of 2012, the sDc implemented a pro-
gram aimed at assisting the macedonian Parliament on its path to becoming 
a well-functioning, autonomous legislature through the improvement of its 
law-making capacities. the establishment and development of the macedonian 
Parliamentary institute, which provides parliamentarians with independent, 
high-quality research and analysis as well as parliamentary training, is meant 
to substantially increase the capacity of parliamentarians to fulfill their con-
stitutional obligation to act as independent legislators and hold government 
accountable. this, and other such projects are still under evaluation, and the 
sDc will take required the time to adapt and ameliorate the existing projects 
for other contexts.
Support to Independent Institutions
in situations where the state is either very weak or dominated by a single 
party (which is almost by definition the case in democratic transitions), cred-
ible, trusted leadership is required for the management of highly sensitive 
and delicate political processes. this role is often delegated – be it by public 
authorities or, in their absence, by international organizations or bodies – to 
independent institutions, composed either of neutral, respected personalities, 
or of diverse sets of political stakeholders whose vested interests balance each 
other. some of the most prominent institutions are constitutional review 
commissions and electoral management bodies, but this category may also 
include Human rights commissions, truth and reconciliation commissions 
and/or media councils, to name just a few. as the independence of these 
institutions is of paramount importance to their credibility, donors can make 
a significant contribution by strengthening their capacity or increasing their 
financial independence. the main challenge related to the strengthening of 
such institutions is that donors tend to focus on short-term, technical assis-
tance rather than building long-term managerial capacity that extends beyond 
singular events or processes.
the sDc sees its comparative advantage in this field mainly in the provision 
of long-term support and capacity building for these types of institutions. For 
example, running from mid-2001 to the end of 2013, the sDc has developed 
a program to strengthen electoral and democratic practices in the southern 
african Development community (saDc). by enhancing the institutional 
and technical capacity of the saDc secretariat and electoral stakeholders in 
lesotho, malawi, mozambique, madagascar, Zambia, Zimbabwe and south 
africa, the program aims to promote peaceful, democratic and credible elec-
tions in the region. the saDc electoral advisory council and its electoral 
support Unit are tasked with assisting and facilitating the consolidation 
of electoral systems and processes by advising member states on strategies 
and issues, enhancing and consolidating the capacity of regional electoral 
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management bodies, and encouraging them to adhere to international best 
practices during elections.
so, what was the impact of the sDc’s recent democracy promotion and 
what experience have we gained? to be frank, the sDc has never systemati-
cally evaluated its development work in terms of democratic variables. some 
of the insights of two other evaluations, however, may be important here, to 
recognize and build upon. the decentralisation efforts of the sDc were most 
recently evaluated in 2007. the overall conclusion of that report was national 
government decentralisation initiatives must include support for government 
at all levels. it also stated, furthermore, that an effective support strategy 
should involve an assessment of the ‘dosage’, or ‘distribution’, of support among 
various players, at various times. the evaluation of the performance of sDc 
instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts found that the sDc is 
wellpositioned to work in fragile states. it has the right mixture of approaches, 
strong operational instincts and the ability to play an important and valuable 
role in the wider international system. the sDc has a range of instruments 
it may employ in fragile contexts. While the individual performance of these 
instruments is strong, there is considerable potential to improve their overall 
performance by bringing the different instruments together to address root 
causes of fragility and conflict. at the same time, the evaluation also notes that 
the sDc needs to become more flexible, and complement its technical efforts 
with political understanding and positioning. the current swiss approach 
to democracy promotion takes up the findings of these two evaluations (sDc, 
2007, 2012a). amongst others, it places a renewed emphasis on the importance 
of a twofold strategy of strengthening the state while simultaneously empow-
ering democratic actors. similarly, the new approach also takes seriously the 
proposition that the sDc must become more political in its work.
such a focus on more explicitly political programing, of course, bears 
certain risks for donors, such as vulnerability to accusations of political inter-
ference or partiality. in the worst case, this could lead to a situation wherein 
certain partners shy away from future collaboration. From a programing point 
of view, not only are political actors are perceived as unpredictable, but due 
to the changeability of political ‘landscapes’, moreover, the relevant political 
program partners are likely to change entirely (due, for example, to early elec-
tions). in sDc projects,9 several strategies have been applied to counter these 
risks, such as (a) engaging with formal institutions, such as a parliamentary 
committee or local parliaments in general (Ukraine). the advantage of work-
ing with formal institutions is that they are not as subject to sudden changes, 
making it is possible to develop sustainable continuity and ownership over 
results. similarly, the sDc also seeks to (b) engage all actors of a specific group, 
such as, for instance, all candidates for mayoral posts, in public discussions on 
political accountability (Kosovo). in this way, all political actors are involved 
in program activities in a transparent and participatory manner. Finally, the 
sDc also works to (c) engage with individual mPs (‘champions of change’), 
9 These examples stem from an e-discussion in the framework of the dlgn learning project on civil society participa-
tion and accountability in local governance processes conducted from 9-19 April 2013.
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whose standing may not be tied solely to their parliamentary mandate, and 
who can engage in project activities or in evidence-based advocacy (serbia).
the best means of assessing the efficacy and success of democracy pro-
motion remains an open issue to be addressed by the overall international 
community, in cooperation with its partner countries.
European Democracy Promotion
Having discussed the swiss perspective on democracy promotion, enlight-
ened by the dominant discourses and debates at the multilateral level, we now 
turn to the potential collaboration of switzerland and the eU in democracy 
promotion. Here, we are interested in a ‘dare to share’ approach. switzerland 
has its own historical experience in promoting democracy in eastern europe. 
today, both switzerland and the eU are interested in capitalizing on their 
knowledge and past experience to support the democratisation process in 
north africa.
the european Union is involved in democracy promotion through the 
new european neighborhood Policy (recently reformed as a result of the 
arab spring). the promotion of democracy also takes other forms, such as the 
interactions between eU officials and the neighboring national governments 
to which they are seconded. Democracy assistance is aid directed at actors 
supporting democratic change. thus far, the eU’s major tool in this regard has 
been the european instrument for Democracy and Human rights (eiDHr), 
which has a budget of eUr 1.1 billion for 2007-2013. Potential grant recipients 
include nearly any type of non-profit individual or group, but exclude public 
authorities. the ec has come to increasingly use its geographic instruments 
to promote democracy in the widest sense (including, for instance, decentral-
isation reforms), both directly or indirectly (e.g. via sector support programs 
that integrate civil society as governance actors).
With the creation of the new european endowment for Democracy (eeD), 
it was hoped that this new body would be able to direct aid independently, 
non-bureaucratically and thus more flexibly and rapidly than the eiDHr. its 
greatest comparative (potential) advantage is the provision of non-bureau-
cratic aid at crucial tipping points for democratic change. in developing the 
concept of the eeD, proponents insisted on the need for this instrument to 
place a greater emphasis, in comparison with the eiDHr, on domestic drivers 
of democratic change, including individuals such as bloggers or journalists. 
other funding mechanisms include the instrument for stability (for fragile/
transitional contexts, approximately eUr 2 billion 2007-13) and the civil 
society Facility (eUr 22 million from 2011-13).
eastern european countries like Poland are particularly credible when 
advising others striving for democracy. their first-hand experience of democ-
ratisation provides them with several insights into what works and what 
does not.
With these recent activities in democracy promotion, the eU has shown it 
wants to move out of its conventional ‘comfort zone’. similarly, switzerland 
envisions a role for itself in improving democracy promotion at the local level 
and will correspondingly alter its approach to democracy to focus primarily 
on ‘drivers of democratic change’, thus becoming more ‘political’. We have a 
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strong interest in sharing experiences and exchanging knowledge as to what 
works and what does not with respect to democracy promotion. We see four 
key areas where switzerland could contribute, in dialogue with the eU, to 
building a better-informed practice of democracy promotion.
• local ownership of democratic agendas: there are several ways in which 
this aim (compatible with the busan agenda) could be achieved. the sDc 
approaches it primarily through several kinds of democracy assessments, 
building upon its past success with local governance assessments. a greater 
focus on the political economy of programs will add to this aim. similarly, 
the sDc encourages the extension and refinement of existing support to 
political institutions. both the eU and the sDc are keen to upgrade their 
cooperation with key democratic stakeholders and political institutions, 
such as parliaments, political parties, electoral commissions and anti-cor-
ruption bodies. this too requires a serious political economic analysis.
• multi-stakeholder approaches and support of civil society: the sDc pro-
motes a sharing of responsibility between local institutions and civil society 
(bolivia, bhutan, macedonia, bosnia and tanzania). in a manner analogous 
to the eU, the sDc has moved away from largely instrumental approaches 
towards broader support for civil society and the establishment of a more 
mature political and strategic partnership. this requires a greater capacity 
to understand dynamics within civil society in order to develop genuine 
support. civil society should thus be strengthened such that it is sufficiently 
informed to ask the right questions of the right persons at the right moment.
• Focus on accountability and participation: the eU and the sDc face a 
common challenge to push democracy forward and further invest in its 
constitutive elements. this includes giving greater prominence to both 
vertical and horizontal accountability and participation. For the purposes 
of the sDc, participation is understood as a political project intended 
to develop and sustain more substantive and empowered participation 
of the citizenry in the political process, such as that typical to a liberal 
representative or semi-direct democracy. through its experience in pro-
moting the institutionalization of popular participation and accountability 
mechanisms in both municipal planning and budgeting and expenditure 
review processes (bolivia, bosnia, macedonia, mali, nepal and tanzania), 
the sDc has a wealth of experience in local accountability, particularly in 
fragile contexts, to contribute to the discussion. similarly, the eU is also 
increasingly involved in attempts to push the accountability agenda for-
ward, both through specific governance interventions and more traditional 
development programs (e.g. sector support to basic service delivery).
• state legitimacy and decentralisation: the eU and the sDc each agree 
that legitimate, capable and effective state institutions are key to promot-
ing both democracy and the development agenda. as a result, there is a 
need to properly articulate development strategies specifically aimed at 
strengthening democracy. as this is closely related to the taxation system, 
this is particularly relevant in connection with state services. the sDc 
can bring in its knowledge of local level dynamics to bear on processes 
of state building, leveraging its vast experience in mobilizing the democ-
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ratisation potential of local governments. the sDc sees decentralisation 
as a political process involving three interlinked dimensions (political, 
administrative and fiscal) and stresses its interdependent outcomes: domes-
tic accountability, inclusive growth and effective public service delivery (in 
terms of access, equity and quality). the eU is also interested in adopting 
a more political approach to supporting decentralisation, enabling to eU 
to fully realize its instrumental value in bringing about better governance 
and development outcomes. in recent years, the eU has also explicitly 
recognized the role of local authorities as full-fledged development actors 
alongside the central government, thus following a multi-actor approach.
Conclusion
the current profile of swiss democracy promotion is strongly guided by 
our experiences in decentralisation and local governance, but also in the 
support and capacity building of civil society. as we seek to strengthen the 
accountability and transparency of the state at the local level. switzerland’s 
credibility with respect to most of the issues related to ‘rendering the state 
more democratic’ is wellestablished. in order to achieve ‘deep democracy’, 
however, and overcome obstacles to the democratisation process, the sDc 
must also move towards new frontiers. there are four main elements that i 
would like to stress in this regard: 
• We need to comprehensively engage with the political elite and broader 
public stakeholders both within and beyond the political institutions of a 
particular country in order to further democracy and development. Demo-
cracy requires both horizontal and vertical checks and balances. important 
players in this regard include, among others, political parties, the media, 
independent institutions and civil society. traditionally, we have preferred 
to view our interventions as primarily technocratic, relating to capacity 
building in the technical understanding of electoral commissions. expe-
rience has shown, however, that the field of democracy assistance is inhe-
rently political. We believe that due to our experience in local democratic 
processes and facilitating multi-stakeholder dialogue, we are wellsuited 
to working with political actors.
• With respect to actors not yet fully incorporated in (or convinced by) demo-
cratisation, we want to engage in a manner typified by an inclusive dialogue 
on the positive effects of democratisation. this might include emphasi-
zing the potential for increased efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability 
in development outcomes and heightened political dividends, such as 
increased legitimacy. this will be done through the appropriate channels, 
i.e. special partnerships, knowledge-sharing and others. Particularly when 
dealing with ‘difficult partnerships’, such an approach might be more 
successful than delaying engagement until a certain level of ‘democracy’ 
or accountability is already in place.
• We will support local governance through the consistent promotion of local 
and domestic ownership of democratisation processes. the more political 
the development objectives, the more important the adherence to local 
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ownership becomes. Democracy promotion must thus be built upon the 
support of local drivers of democracy.
• Given all these goals, a word of caution may be warranted: the more we 
become involved in this type of support, the more resistance we will face 
from those in positions of power. We will not be able to focus on domestic 
drivers of change in a large number of diverse contexts. our resource limi-
tations will inevitably constrain this kind of sophisticated work, which 
requires intelligence on the ground, adapted support modalities and poli-
tical leadership. We are aware that ill-conceived or unprepared attempts 
to move out of our comfort zone may cause more harm than good.
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comments on ‘Democracy Promotion at a local level’
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the article ‘Democracy Promotion at a local level: experiences, Perspec-
tives and Policy of swiss international cooperation’ by martin Dahinden 
presents a fine and complex analysis of what could constitute a concrete and 
efficient democratisation aid policy; it highlights possible limitations of such a 
policy, the complexity of levels of intervention and the need to implement this 
policy within the context of a given civil society and local power dynamics.
such democratisation aid clearly arises from an assumed voluntarism (it is 
practically a moral and political obligation) and while the perspective is meant 
to be pragmatic and realistic, there is nevertheless an idealistic dimension. 
one does not negotiate on values inscribed in the swiss constitution nor on 
the democratic model that one wishes to introduce. this model is based on a 
precise two-tiered definition of democracy: majority rule (elections) and the 
rule of law (separation of powers, constitution). since free elections can bring 
actors to power who do not favour the rule of law, it is important that both pil-
lars be raised simultaneously. the rule of law, freedom of expression, respect 
for human rights, an independent judicial system and impartial administra-
tion are essential, non-negotiable conditions when one speaks of democracy.
the first problem that therefore arises is that instead of examining the 
local political culture an imported model is being used – even though this 
definition of democracy is supposed to be a universally acknowledged one.
that said, gone are the days of direct intervention (from Dayton to bagdad 
by way of Kabul), which were inspired by the 1945 model (implanting key-in-
hand democracy in countries assumed to lack or to have forsaken democratic 
values). this is because direct intervention has failed, at least relatively, but 
above all because it implies prior direct military intervention that the West 
is no longer willing or able to pursue. However, abandoning the project of 
exportation, whose failure has clearly been underscored by mr Dahinden, has 
not yet led to a revival of cynical realpolitik (though one might ask whether 
the West’s failure in syria is not facilitated by a certain dose of cynicism: since 
most of the actors are a potential threat to the West, let the massacre continue).
the problem is therefore to help establish a precise model of democracy, 
relying in principle on local structures, since direct management is out of 
the question. When the countries concerned are themselves actively involved 
in a democratisation process, the approach is straightforward: in such cases, 
technical assistance may be desired (at least officially) by the states in ques-
tion and may also enjoy a broad consensus within the political class as well 
as among government officials or local actors. the matter then becomes a 
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purely technical one, free from major political considerations. the ‘know-
how’ shared within the framework of cooperation has a multiplier effect and 
serves to accelerate the democratisation process (this was the case of the former 
communist countries in europe). However, when neither the local authorities 
nor the dominant political culture favour democratisation, the provision of 
democratisation aid must be dealt with differently.
as pointed out in thearticle, in case democracy cannot be exported, and a 
state is not interested in a democratisation process, or a state does not exist 
(failed state), democratisation must take place through a relatively autonomous 
‘civil society’, a term that is somewhat overused nowadays. on the positive 
side, experience has shown that there is almost always a popular demand 
for democracy. However, this does not mean that democracy automatically 
ensues; we recall that in every single election that followed the collapse of 
a dictatorship – iraq, afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, tunisia – or was held in the 
wake of sudden electoral openness – algeria in 1991 – there was a major 
voter turnout despite a very real danger in some cases (afghanistan, iraq). 
and in each case, the election was followed by disappointment due to a lack 
of institutions and competent policymakers. in other words, the process lost 
its dynamic. today, the areas concerned are mainly the former communist 
territories, the balkans, the caucasus and central asia, as well as the middle 
east, i.e. countries where muslims form the majority, countries where muslims 
form a strong minority as well as countries in conflict with muslim countries. 
islam is therefore often perceived as a specific obstacle to democratisation.
the problem therefore is one of finding ways to encourage a democratisation 
movement in areas where the states or local power brokers (warlords) oppose 
it. reference to the swiss model is particularly interesting in that this model 
is based on the idea of building democracy from the bottom up rather than 
pursuing a more or less ideologically driven state project; this model is well-
suited for fragmented societies (multi-ethnic, tribal or geographically isolated 
societies) where development may be experienced at different rates from one 
zone to another while nevertheless having an osmosis effect. Within this con-
text, the pursuit of micro-projects makes perfect sense but raises other issues.
since the model used is rarely indigenous, democratisation aid implies 
the need to select local actors who share the ‘western’ vision of democracy 
or who may potentially act as instruments of democratisation through their 
personal activities (e.g. independent journalists). this therefore implies the 
creation of interfaces (nGos, foundations, development agencies) that iden-
tify and reinforce local structures and serve as a means of circumventing 
state authority or powers that may not be in favour, or may even be against, 
a democratisation project.
in other words, such a vision of democratisation involves social engineering, 
by selecting and encouraging specific actors and groups who will receive aid. 
this is done with the aim of enhancing their influence and role in society 
(support for the weakest groups such as women, etc.). the insistence on ‘gender’ 
is interesting (and relatively new to western aid with the concept of empow-
erment, i.e. increasing one’s capacity to exert local influence over collective 
decisions). However, gender mainstreaming at times is perceived as both an 
attack against the local culture and wishful thinking: while no assessment 
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has yet been made of the situation in afghanistan, local power structures 
do not seem to have changed as a result of measures aimed at giving women 
greater influence at the local level, e.g. by making gender parity mandatory in 
village councils responsible for aid distribution. civil society is supposed to 
be relatively autonomous, which implies that when civil society is oriented 
in a given direction (reinforcing weak actors, for instance), this should have 
an almost mechanical effect on that society’s capacity for democratisation. 
and yet, there are doubts as to whether civil society organisations (csos) are 
truly rooted and have the capacity to drive democratisation policies even at 
the local level.
the article does not elude the problem: any action taken to reinforce and 
include ‘weak’ groups invariably has local political consequences because 
it calls existing power relationships into question and may lead to reactions 
of hostility (assassinations or abductions) or circumvention (maintaining 
appearances but leaving the true power structures intact). the risk is to create 
islands of democratic practices, akin to an indian reservation where inde-
pendent journalists, female entrepreneurs and human rights activists would 
live in a loosely integrated space on the margins of society and under western 
protection, whether such protection is provided directly or at arm’s length 
(i.e. the latter could be the case of the young malalai in Pakistan).
the challenge is therefore considerable. However, another problem also 
needs to be considered: democratisation is certainly more than a mere tech-
nical approach. it is an eminently political endeavour that calls into question 
power relationships at both the local and national level. a democratisation 
policy may reach a deadlock over local and national political stakes because 
the dual focus placed on civil society and local actors of democratisation may 
fail to consider the political game unfolding within the given society. every 
society is political and local figures have national relays. the arab spring also 
showed that ‘objective’ actors of democratisation may not have a democratic 
vision of society, as was the case for instance of the salafi mouvements s in 
egypt, which enjoy strong support among voters; this voter base mistrusts the 
elitist muslim brotherhood and perceives the salafis as being closer to the 
populace and therefore more ‘democratic’ (a vote cast in favour of the salafis 
is not necessarily a pro-sharia vote, since the muslim brotherhood also sup-
ports sharia rule). How is one supposed to deal with local actors who enjoy 
popular support but who also favour the sharia over democracy?
the key, as highlighted in the report, is to work at the local level. However, 
as we have seen, the ‘political’ actors, i.e. those who vie for local power are 
not necessarily the ‘right’ actors from the western standpoint. this is because 
their power is derived from the use of force (e.g. afghani warlords) or because 
their position within civil society is the result of practices that are inherently 
undemocratic (notable figures, clan or tribal chiefs, aristocracy in all its forms). 
it is therefore not uncommon to see a western actor call for the removal of 
these bad actors, if necessary through legal means (accusing warlords of war 
crimes, for instance), which automatically expels them from the political 
arena. However, these individuals have no intention of disappearing quietly. 
We must therefore re-examine the main premise underpinning all action taken 
in favour of democratisation, namely that ‘there is no democracy without a 
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democrat’: it is a matter of chicken and egg, since democracy is not a feature, 
it is a system. one can only work with actors who are committed to ‘real’ 
local political life, who therefore also have their own interests at stake. it is 
important to build democracy at the local level but to also ensure that this 
democracy is a political one, i.e. where all actors indeed have real ‘power’ 
and not merely democratic ideas. in this sense, the creation of a municipal 
democracy should be a priority objective. it was the practice of local democ-
racy, for instance, that convinced the leaders of the turkish aKP to play the 
democratic game, regardless of their own personal convictions. this is clearly 
expressed in the article: democracy is primarily a matter of politics.
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How can it realistically be done?
Comments by Jean Bossuyt
Head of Strategy, EU External Action Programme of the European Centre for Development Policy 
Management (ECDPM).
 bossuyt, J. (2014) ‘Providing effective support to ‘deep democracy’:  how can it realistically 
be done?’, International Development Policy, no. 4.3, pp. 128–132 http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/
poldev.1699.
martin Dahinden’s article on ‘Democracy Promotion at the local level: 
Experiences, Perspectives and Policy of Swiss International Cooperation’ comes 
at the right time. Democracy promotion is not a new topic on the agenda of 
the international (european) community. since the democratisation wave 
of the early 1990s that swept across the developing world, a wide range of 
donor-supported programmes, mobilising substantial funds, have sought to 
build institutions and nurture democratic values in hugely diversified coun-
try contexts. more recently, the arab spring re-emphasised the aspirations 
of people to human dignity, inclusive development and respect for rights 
and democratic values. yet it also painfully illustrated the limitations of 
Western democracy promotion efforts. Despite much rhetoric, europe had 
for many years privileged geopolitical stability over democracy, as reflected 
in its support to authoritarian régimes. the upheavals in north africa acted 
as a wake-up call and led to a quite substantial revision of european policies 
towards human rights and democracy. catherine ashton, the High repre-
sentative for Foreign affairs and security Policy of the european Union (eU) 
went as far as to claim that from now on human rights would be the ‘silver 
thread’ in europe’s external action. all this explains the popularity of the 
concept of ‘deep democracy’ across donor agencies –though the exact mean-
ing of this term remains relatively unclear. yet there can be little doubt that 
Western countries are looking at new ways to answer old questions such as: 
How can democracy be supported from abroad without imposing models? 
How can the substance (rather than the form) of democracy be strengthened 
(e.g. norms, values, behaviour of public officials and citizens)? Who are the 
drivers of change and how best to support them? 
the article by martin Dahinden aptly summarises some of the emerg-
ing elements of consensus on how to operationalize the concept of ‘deep 
democracy’. He stresses the essential complementarity between democracy 
and development (including job creation) and re-affirms the need to anchor 
democracy promotion in a home-grown and shared democratic agenda (to be 
forged over time through inclusive dialogue processes). He rightly argues that 
effective democracy support requires donors to ‘move towards new frontiers’; 
recognise the inherently political nature of democratic reforms; be prepared 
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to think and act politically (using political economy analysis as a navigation 
tool) and to engage over a longer period of time with a diversity of actors and 
institutions at various level, with a particular focus on the local level (as the 
bedrock of democracy, especially in fragile states).
much of this resonates with current eU thinking on democracy, human 
rights and governance. in the last three years, the eU has issued a stream of 
important ‘communications’ on the matter. they all emphasize the central 
place of democracy and governance in eU external action. these include the 
new cooperation vision spelled out in the 2011 ‘agenda for change’, several 
communications regarding the partnership with the european neighbourhood 
as well as the promise of a more ‘strategic engagement’ with civil society10 and 
local authorities11. the revised eU budget support guidelines now explicitly 
link the provision of general budget support to democracy and human rights 
performance. However, much alike other donor agencies, the eU is struggling 
to find adequate ways and means to effectively translate these new commit-
ments into practice. the limited progress achieved in the partnership on 
democratic governance and human rights, organised under the auspices of the 
‘Joint africa-europe strategy’ (Jaes) is but one illustration of the complexity 
of the task involved. all this suggests that there is indeed scope for a much 
deeper dialogue and cooperation between the eU and swiss cooperation 
with a view to build a ‘better informed practice of democracy promotion’ (as 
pleaded for by Dahinden).
in order to further promote a debate on the ‘new frontiers’ to be explored 
by external actors willing to engage in domestic democratisation arenas, it 
seems useful to raise three questions.
the first question is straightforward:  Do we know enough to be an effec-
tive actor in democracy support and are we ready to apply this knowledge? 
the issue of knowledge is seldom put forward in official discourse, yet it is 
absolutely key as donor agencies abandon the illusion of ‘exporting models’ 
and rather seek to promote ‘deep democracy’ from within. this means influ-
encing domestic processes, driven by a wide variety of actors through a set 
of sophisticated, country-tailored interventions12. this is quite a different 
ballgame altogether. if your knowledge of the domestic democracy arena (in 
the broad sense) is limited, you may end up doing more harm than good. mr. 
Dahinden recognises that the impact of swiss democracy support was ‘never 
systematically evaluated’ (with exceptions related to sDc work on decentral-
isation and in fragile states). the eU also faces this challenge of knowledge. 
in the past ten years it has done several strategic evaluations regarding good 
governance (2006), aid channelled through civil society (2008), support to 
justice reforms (2011) human rights (2011) and decentralisation (2012). it is 
interesting to note that these major evaluations generate quite similar overall 
conclusions. they all point to the growing sophistication of ec/eU policy 
10 EU Communication (September 2012): The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement 
with Civil Society in external action. COM (2012), 492, final.
11 EU Communication (May 2013):  Empowering local authorities in partner countries for enhanced governance and more 
effective development outcomes. COM (2013), 280 final.
12 In his comment on Mr. Dahinden’s article, Olivier Roy equates this type of donor work with ‘social engineering’.
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frameworks with regard to governance, democracy and human rights, partic-
ularly from 2000 onwards. they confirm the inclusion of civil society as a key 
actor in development and democratization processes. yet they also converge 
that there is a major gap between policy discourse and implementation, with 
instruments often taking precedence above clear political choices and related 
intervention strategies. the various evaluations also indicate that eU (donor) 
support has often been confronted with a ‘deficit of ownership’ especially when 
the programmes were targeting governments. there is no shortage of ‘supply’ 
of governance support on the eU side, yet this offer was often matched with 
a clear ‘demand’ for reform emanating from the other side. the problem is 
compounded by a number of flaws that can be observed in eU intervention 
strategies such as the still recurrent use of normative approaches; the reliance 
on financial incentives schemes that are premised on the assumption that 
one can ‘buy reforms’13; and a tendency to equate ownership with the agenda 
of the central government. these are all valuable lessons, but their effective 
‘uptake’ by the aid system is not evident. the same holds true for the use of 
political economy analysis. the eU has made strides to integrate this critical 
tool in its overall strategies. yet its effective application in actual cooperation 
processes has proven quite challenging. such a tool is not neutral.  it tends 
to transform both the role of donor agencies and ‘the way of doing business’. 
there is understandable hesitation –if not resistance- to follow this path as 
it may create tensions with governments and hamper aid disbursement. all 
this suggests the need to further explore how donors could obtain and use 
deep knowledge to promote deep democracy.
the second question relates to a growing concern of many Western donors: 
What to do in countries where the space for democracy is shrinking?  While 
several countries have made significant democratic advances over the past 
two decades, the overall ‘health bill’ of democracy does not look that rosy. in 
many developing countries, democratic processes are stagnating, if not losing 
ground. the backlash is reflected in the growing number of sham democra-
cies, manipulations of constitutions to retain power and the emergence of 
‘hybrid regimes’ – systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of democ-
racy and its formal trappings with limited freedoms and authoritarian traits. 
many countries are issuing laws that reduce the space for the existence of an 
autonomous civil society. elections have become a major trigger of conflicts. 
on top of this, the central place of democracy is increasingly contested by 
‘developmental states’ of an authoritarian nature (e.g. ethiopia, rwanda) and 
by the increasingly dominant presence of other international players (e.g. the 
brics or Gulf states) that do not share the same democracy/human rights 
agenda. What does all this mean for Western democracy promotion efforts? 
it could be argued that europe should continue to put democracy and human 
at the centre of its external action, both for its instrumental value (in terms 
of ensuring inclusive development, justice and an effective management of 
13 This brings along the whole question of ‘incentives’ that could be used to promote reforms. Experience so far has 
been sobering, as illustrated by the EU Governance Facility (2006-2011) whose substantial Incentive Tranche (2.7 billion 
Euro) failed to achieve any meaningful impact. It remains to be seen whether the new incentive approach, based on the 
‘more-for more’ principle’, now adopted by the EU in the European Neighbourhood, will be more successful.
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global challenges) and as a core value underpinning the eU construction. 
it can claim to do so with some legitimacy as across the world people also 
mobilise for getting better governance systems. the arab spring is the latest 
example of this universal aspiration to human dignity, equity and democratic 
and accountable governance. yet while the ultimate destination may remain 
the same (democracy as a global public good), Western actors seem in dire 
need of much more realistic, political savvy and coherent implementation 
strategies. that will be crucial challenge in the next years. Just two exam-
ples to quickly illustrate this point.  the eU has committed itself to foster an 
‘enabling environment’ for civil society. yet how will this be concretely done 
in countries that issue highly restrictive laws or systematically harass civil 
society activists? What leverage has the eU to intervene? What actions could 
it usefully undertake? the second example requires an even deeper exercise 
of soul-searching. How credible can the eU be in democracy promotion? the 
lack of coherence and use of double standards has been widely identified as 
the achillesheel of Western democracy promotion efforts. What is the real 
space for changing this fundamental flaw in the near future? some argue 
that the chances look grim. the current ‘scramble’ for markets and resources 
(under the banner of new economic diplomacy) may further reduce eU policy 
coherence and erode the credibility of our democratic discourse.
the third question relates to the title of mr. Dahinden’s article:  How can 
the local level be more structurally integrated in development and democra-
tisation processes? european policy makers are increasingly aware that the 
action terrain of ‘deep democracy’ is ‘local’ as much as it is national. this 
is even more the case for fragile states, where the challenge is often to first 
build the local foundations of effective state-society relations. the local level 
provides a potentially conducive space for people to interact directly with 
state authorities, engage in collective action, jointly define local development 
priorities, forge new governance practices (such as participatory budgeting) 
and cultivate citizenship. the local level is also where development outcomes 
materialize. sound national policies are a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion to trigger development. in order to implement national or sector policies, 
a strong link with the local level is crucial. Without the effective participation 
of local stakeholders the risk is high that national policies will not land on 
fertile soil. in this context, it should be remembered that the tunisian revolt 
did not start in the capital but in a secondary town and region that had been 
neglected in social and economic terms. also here the challenge will be to 
make a qualitative jump forward in overall donor intervention strategies to 
unlock this (largely dormant) local potential. the task at hand is to properly 
frame the local dimension of democratisation processes; to support multi-actor 
dialogue on what this local democracy agenda entails in a particular context; 
to encourage systematic cooperation between different levels of governance; 
and to ensure that all donor interventions (e.g. in sectors) consistently incor-
porate the local dimension (including the role of local authorities as elected 
democratic bodies). this jump forward could be done by capitalizing on a 
wide range of (documented) experiences with local development, decentral-
isation and local governance (including lessons learnt by sDc who has been 
very active in this field). there are huge opportunities in many countries to 
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build alliances with local actors, who are struggling to be heard and to be 
take seriously in policy processes and cooperation efforts. 
bringing Politics back
Comments by Didier Péclard
Senior researcher & Head of the Statehood and Conflict Programme, swisspeace; Lecturer, University of 
Basel.
 Péclard, D. (2014) ‘bringing Politics back’, International Development Policy, no. 4.3, http://
dx.doi.org/10.4000/poldev.1761.
martin Dahinden’s article on ‘Democracy Promotion at the local level: 
Experiences, Perspectives and Policy of Swiss International Cooperation’ is 
a welcome and timely contribution to on-going debates about the meaning 
of democratisation and external support to democracy. since the end of the 
cold War and with the rise of the ‘good governance’ agenda, the dominant 
approach to democracy promotion within multinational institutions as well 
as bilateral donor agencies has been a rather normative and technocratic one. 
the role of the West in accompanying transition from autocratic regimes to 
democracy was restricted to the export of ‘its’ model of liberal democracy, and 
supporting the development of democratic governance was seen as a matter 
of finding the right tools needed to ‘fix’ malfunctioning state institutions. 
this technocratic approach is based on a deep-rooted belief in the power 
of social engineering, i.e. the idea that political institutions such as account-
able and functioning states can be engineered, crafted, constructed through 
outside intervention. it translates into concentrating on what one could call 
the ‘hardware’ of democracy (elections, constitutions, security sector reform, 
etc.) to the detriment of its ‘software’, i.e. the long-term social construction of 
legitimacy through struggles, negotiations and trade-offs taking place within 
state-society relations. However, as martin Dahinden argues, in opposition to 
technocratic approaches, democratisation is “inherently political” because it 
is “a process that by definition changes the power dynamics within a society”, 
and so is democracy promotion. but what exactly does it mean to recognise 
the ‘inherently political’ nature of democracy promotion? What kind of impli-
cations does this have for development policies and practices? What are the 
main challenges linked to this? the present short commentary discusses some 
of the most important elements of this political approach and highlights some 
challenges as well as possible inconsistencies between discourse and practice. 
the first issue in this context concerns processes of social and political 
change. How does democratic change happen? are there common traits across 
the large historical diversity of transition from autocratic rule to democracy, 
or is the history of each and every transition inherently idiosyncratic and 
therefore hardly replicable? While this issue has, logically, always been at 
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the core of democracy promotion, it has been of particular political salience 
since the beginning of the arab spring. 
Firstly, it is the overthrow of long-established authoritarian regimes in 
tunisia, egypt and libya which brought the very issue of democratisation 
back onto the agenda of the international community. Very present in the 
first years following the end of the cold War, the issue of democratisation as 
a process of “change in the power dynamics within a society” had indeed 
somewhat subsided in the course of the following two decades with the rise 
of technocratic perspectives – expressed by the good governance agenda and 
the gradual shift towards results-oriented policy thinking such as the mil-
lennium Development Goals.
secondly, the arab spring has called renewed attention to the issue of 
transition towards democracy, and in particular to the transitology paradigm. 
Developed in the immediate post-cold War era, the paradigm aimed to create a 
universal theory of democratic change beyond historical and social diversity. 
it rests on the idea that democratisation happens because of decisions taken 
by the elite rather than for structural reasons, and that it is a gradual process 
with clearly distinguishable phases. one of the central lessons of the arab 
spring has been that transnational links, both material and symbolic, do play 
an important role in the diffusion of revolutionary ideas, in the passage from 
social discontentment to political upheaval and mass demonstration, as well 
as in getting attention, however ambiguous, from the international commu-
nity. However, three years after the beginning of the arab spring, it is clear 
that the basic assumption of the transitology paradigm, namely the idea that 
democratic change follows a more or less linear process, is flawed. Possible 
scenarios in tunisia, egypt and libya, among others, vary from democratic 
consolidation to the return of authoritarian rule, conservative modernization, 
the entrenchment of autocratic regimes as well as outright civil war. 
social and political change, in other words, is a deeply unpredictable, 
contradictory and undetermined process. Whatever the importance of trans-
national dynamics and the international context, change (democratic or other) 
is first and foremost the result of internal historical dynamics, and it has to 
be apprehended as such. this has two main implications. the first is straight-
forward and seems to be well established now within the donor community 
(even if its concrete implementation continues to be problematic): local his-
torical, political and social context matters and it should be at the centre of 
any democracy promotion or development project, not ready-made toolbox 
approaches. the second is more complex and has to do with local perceptions 
of political legitimacy. legitimacy is at the heart of democracy promotion. to 
put it in Dahinden’s words, “legitimate, capable and effective state institutions 
are key to promoting both democracy and the development agenda”. the arti-
cle rightly distinguishes between the “output side of government legitimacy, 
i.e. government capability and performance in delivering essential services 
to citizens” and the “input side of government legitimacy, i.e. […] how and 
to what extent citizens are able to influence decision-making”. it also argues 
that so far the focus has been on output legitimacy, and that this should be 
balanced with a deeper commitment to input legitimacy. 
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this is no doubt an important step towards a more political and less techni-
cal perspective on democracy promotion, since it places state-society relations 
at the centre. the issue of legitimacy, however, is broader and more complex. 
in so-called fragile contexts, public authority is not exercised by state actors 
alone. many non-state actors such as traditional authorities, religious lead-
ers, local and international nGos, community based organisations, private 
companies, vigilante groups and armed movements perform state-like func-
tions. statehood, in other words, is the product of a complex web of relations, 
negotiations and trade-offs between formal and visible institutions of the state 
on the one hand and other ‘performers’ of public authority on the other. the 
challenge in such contexts is that the “legitimate, capable and effective state 
institutions”, upon which democratic rule and development can be built, 
are extremely diverse and by far not restricted to the confines of the ‘official’ 
state. it is therefore crucial to understand how legitimacy is constructed and 
infused with social meaning locally, and who the potential bearers (träger in 
the Weberian sense) of legitimacy are. Democracy in its broadest sense (i.e. as 
a set of values, of political practices, institutions and rights) is by far not the 
only source of legitimacy at the local level and it has to compete with other, 
alternative sources. in fact, in many contexts of transition from authoritarian 
rule as well as in the aftermath of a violent conflict, institutions that are the 
product of programmes of democratic reforms, such as local representatives of 
the central state (parliaments and other locally elected bodies, decentralised 
government agencies) are not necessarily perceived by local populations as 
more legitimate than, for instance, former armed movements, religious lead-
ers and associations, traditional chiefs and authorities, or local businessmen 
associations. besides, memories of the state are often linked, especially in 
formerly colonised countries and in conflict-affected areas, with stories of 
abuse, coercion, and violence rather than with human rights and democratic 
practices. this does not mean, as ‘culturalist’ thinkers have argued, that local, 
‘traditional’ structures are per se better and more legitimate than ‘modern’ ones 
and that traditional societies and power structures should be protected from 
the onslaught of the modern state. as social historians of the colonial world 
have shown, traditions are always partly ‘invented’. many so-called traditional 
chiefs in present-day africa for instance have in fact colonial origins and 
many have been instrumentalised by colonial as well as postcolonial regimes. 
this means, however, that democracy is not only ‘deep’. it is also broad and 
multifaceted in the range of actors that its promotion potentially concerns. 
this raises two sets of questions for democracy promotion. (1) to what 
extent should social and political institutions that lay beyond the perimeter 
of the democratic state as defined by Western donors but are seen as legitimate 
locally be integrated into the democratisation agenda? (2) can institutions that 
do not work according to Western democratic norms but reflect historically 
developed values of legitimate rule contribute to democracy promotion? in 
other words, and echoing a comment made in this debate by olivier roy, does 
it (only) take democrats to build democracy, or can democratic change also be 
the (unintended) consequence of the role played in transition processes by the 
adversaries and even outspoken enemies of democracy? there is of course no 
easy and one-size-fits-all answer to these questions, but they should be taken 
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on board when reflecting about the links between legitimacy, democracy and 
development. 
the second issue concerns the local. martin Dahinden’s article stresses the 
importance of the local in democracy promotion and brings forward the very 
rich expertise that sDc has acquired in this field over the past decades. He 
concludes that “democracy promotion must […] be built upon the support of 
local drivers of democracy”. this is no doubt important and a healthy antidote 
to top down approaches limited to the national level, which run the risk of 
perpetuating social and political inequalities within a country. However, 
‘the local’ as apprehended by development actors is a category that is more 
ambiguous than it may seem at first sight and not without contradictions 
either. the promotion of ‘good governance’ by development agencies through 
local actors and power structures, while based on a genuine concern for 
more accountability and citizen participation in (state) politics at local level, 
is often also rooted in a deep distrust for the state in developing countries, 
considered as inefficient, corrupt and illegitimate. this distrust is in line 
with neo-liberal development orthodoxies of the 1980s and 1990s based on 
economic laissez-faire and efforts at reducing state apparatuses to their bare 
minimum. Development projects, by relying heavily on what J.-P. olivier de 
sardan and t. bierschenk have called ‘local development brokers’, resulted not 
only in the promotion of alternative power structures that by-passed the state, 
thereby eventually contributing to further weakening it, de-legitimising it and 
rendering it more inefficient, but also in the development of new networks of 
clientelism and local neo-patrimonial structures. one of the challenges of a 
renewed political perspective of the promotion of democracy through local 
power structures therefore is to work on the links between state and society 
and on the possible articulation of the different sources and forms of public 
authority (state and non-state), rather than considering them as two distinct 
and competing spheres. 
the local level is often perceived as inherently distinct from the national, 
international or global levels. this is misleading on two accounts. Firstly, 
many local actors are well connected through personal, family or other ties 
to the national, as well as to the international levels, as is the case for the 
development brokers mentioned above. the local therefore should not be 
conceived in isolation from other spheres. secondly, ‘the local’ as the terrain 
of democracy promotion can easily be idealised if not romanticised, and 
local actors and institutions considered as inherently good, legitimate, and 
accountable because they are, as if ‘by nature’, closer to the needs and interests 
of the people. local actors are extremely diverse and ‘the local’ is, like any 
polity, fraught with social and political tensions and competitions, which 
interventions in the name of development and democracy can (re-)ignite 
rather than contribute to solving. a good case in point here is the return of 
discourses of ‘autochthony’ in africa, which can be, partly at least, traced 
back to changes in the local power structures induced by democratisation and 
decentralisation policies. Decentralisation, and local elections in particular, 
have imbued local constituencies with a new political meaning, raising the 
stakes of local political competition. and in cases where long-term residents 
have been outvoted by newly arrived immigrants, as in Douala, cameroon 
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in the mid-1990s, it has been one of the bedrocks for the return to claims of 
autochthony and to exclusionist visions and policies of citizenship. 
the third and final issue concerns time. as the article points out, echoing 
the new Deal for engagement in fragile states signed in november 2011 in 
busan, state-building is a long-term process which “requires a long-term 
commitment”. this point is by now well-established within policy circles and 
implementing agencies. it is also in line with the ‘re-politicised’ perspective 
on democracy promotion that martin Dahinden’s article advocates. indeed, 
moving from a focus on the ‘hardware’ of democracy to the ‘software’ of state 
formation processes is only possible if we take a long-term perspective. Dis-
courses and practices of development, however, as well as other spheres of 
international engagement such as peacebuilding, are increasingly dominated 
and constrained by a results-oriented mind-set. in part because of the very con-
crete need for development agencies to legitimise in their home countries the 
programmes they implement abroad, in part as a result of a broader Zeitgeist. 
the necessity to show measurable results has become increasingly important. 
the millennium Development Goals, with their focus on the measurability 
of indicators as the ‘proof’ of a country’s progress towards development, are 
perhaps the most symptomatic expression of this trend. the problem is that 
there are many potential tensions and contradictions between the short-term 
logic and the impatient character of results-orientation on the one hand, and 
long-term commitment to democracy promotion on the other. Whether the 
inclusion of democracy as one of the goals of the post-2015 agenda, which 
the article advocates and sDc as an institution supports, will be enough to 
solve this problem is, at best, an open question. this does not, however, take 
anything away from the article’s main contribution, namely that it is crucial 
to ‘bring politics back in’ democracy promotion. 
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